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Progress, democracy, efficiency:  
Normative narratives in political science EU Studies  
 
Sociologists of knowledge and historians of science stress that scholars produce narratives 
that have a vital role in interpreting and legitimising major political developments. The 
modern social sciences emerged to a great extent as the intellectual infrastructure of 
nineteenth-century nation states. Stephanie Mudge and Antoine Vauchez thus see 
‘knowledge-bearing elites’, linking academia with politics, as equally central to both 
‘Western state-building processes’ and European integration (2012, p. 450). Despite episodes 
like European Commission President José Manuel Barroso’s references since 2008 to the 
political scientist Ian Manner’s normative power thesis (Manners, 2015, p. 330), scholars 
disagree about whether academics have directly influenced European integration politics, and 
in particular, 1960s Commission strategy (Cohen & Weisbein, 2005, pp. 354-60; Kaiser, 
2010, p. 52; Mudge & Vauchez, 2012, p. 459; Rosamond, 2015, p. 186; White, 2003, p. 126). 
There is more consensus however on the continuing importance of indirect academic 
influence on European integration politics, through factors like networks, press-reporting, the 
university education of political leaders, and the academic professional background of some 
of them, including Barroso (Kaiser, 2010; White, 2003, p. 131). Sociologists therefore draw 
on Pierre Bourdieu to describe academic institutions as part of ‘a nascent European field of 
power’ (Cohen, 2011, pp. 336-37). 
Although the key power of academics is to develop and legitimise narratives of European 
integration, only one existing work expressly identifies these in current EU studies. The 
historian Mark Gilbert argues that scholars of the EU have always systematically generated 
teleological ‘narrative accounts’ of its inexorable progress towards supranational integration 
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(2008, p. 649). Until the 1990s for example, theoretical debate in political science EU Studies 
(PS-EUS) revolved around neo-functionalism. This theory provided a mechanism for 
progressive (i.e. continuously intensifying) integration and was very close to the European 
Commission’s own understanding of integration as a process (White, 2003, p. 114). 
This article explores and analyses the presence and use of narratives by scholars in political 
science, the central discipline within the multi- or interdisciplinary field of EUS. It confirms 
that Gilbert’s progressive narrative remains important in the most highly-cited PS-EUS 
journal articles, but that narratives of democratic deficit and efficiency are also significant. In 
addition, the article relates currently dominant narratives to an increasingly negative tone 
towards European integration in PS-EUS articles since about 1998.  
The research for this article exclusively addressed writing practices, ignoring other important 
academic normativity practices, such as political engagement or the conscious or unconscious 
choice of topic, evidence and research methods. I systematically analysed expressions of 
normativity, which signalled that European integration, or its functioning, institutions or 
policies, was bad, good, flourishing or declining, in the 73 most cited PS-EUS peer-reviewed 
articles (see appendix). This corpus, or canon, was defined by searching Google Scholar on 
29 April 2015 for the terms ‘European Union’, ‘European integration’, their French and 
German equivalents and ‘EU’ and selecting political science articles. These articles are 
referenced in the text with a # followed by their ranking in the canon (e.g. Scharpf, #3). 
Normative expressions, which appeared to some extent in the texts of 85% of the 73 articles 
and quite assertively in more than 75% of them, are treated as the necessary building blocks 
of politically useful narratives.  
Three trends should be expected to draw scholarly attention to practices of normativity in 
EUS writing. First, a large post-positivist constructivist and critical studies literature has, 
since the 1990s, increasingly challenged the previously dominant positivist approach to 
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political science (Bevir, 2006, pp.  591 & 600). This literature has ‘warmly embraced’ ‘a 
reflection on the relation between political science and politics’, including normativity in 
public, elite and official discourse on European integration (Berling & Bueger, 2013, p. 116). 
While the normative power thesis constitutes a prominent example, the autobiographical 
reflexivity of feminist and critical scholars particularly supports reflection about scholarly 
normativity (Eagleton-Pierce, 2011, pp. 808-9). Second, questions about the democratic 
legitimacy of EU governance stimulated what is often labelled a ‘normative turn’ in EUS in 
the 1990s, placing issues of justice on the disciplinary agenda (Bellamy & Attucci, 2009, p. 
198). Third, since the millennium, some EUS scholars, especially in France, have turned a 
reflexive eye to the organisation and practices of their own field (e.g. Mudge & Vauchez, 
2012; Rosamond, 2007). Parallel developments in International Relations (IR), drawing 
particular inspiration from Bourdieu’s key concept of reflexivity, suggest this is part of a 
broader opening in political science to the sociology of knowledge (Berling & Bueger, 2013, 
p. 116; Eagleton-Pierce, 2011, pp. 805-6 & 815). Though the EU inspired neither Bourdieu’s 
affection nor much of his interest, his ideas are central to the recent flourishing of reflexive 
sociological work on European integration (Madsen, 2011, p. 259; Cohen, 2011, pp. 335 & 
338; Favell & Guiraudon, 2011, pp. 2-3; Kauppi, 2003, pp. 781-82; Parsons, 2010, pp. 150-
52). The ‘double rupture’ of Bourdieusian reflexivity insists on critically examining not just 
‘the object itself’ (i.e. the EU), ‘but also… the dominant academic preconstructions’ of it 
(Madsen, 2011, p. 262).  
Nevertheless, scholarly practices of normativity, impartiality, objectivity, value neutrality, 
etc. have so far been a Cinderella topic in political science. Several historians and legal 
scholars of the EU identify strong pro-European political agendas in their fields, but they 
focus heavily on early scholarship (Robert & Vauchez, 2010, pp. 15-16; Varsori, 2010, p. 6). 
Even self-described critical scholars are accused of using reflexivity to attack the positivist 
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mainstream, rather than reflecting on their own practices (Berling & Bueger, 2013, p. 116). 
Scholars struggle with contradictions within reflexivity and especially with the still powerful 
grip of the positivist stricture that ‘‘good’ scholarship’ and ‘rigour’ require ‘an objectivist 
gaze free from personality’ (Berling & Bueger, 2013; Eagleton-Pierce, 2011, p. 809). This 
positivist scientific ideology of neutral, objective and apolitical discovery and analysis of real 
facts about the world remains a ‘prevailing convention’ in science, despite sociologists of 
knowledge having criticised it for decades as a social construct (Berling & Bueger, 2013, pp.  
115-16; Harding, 1992, pp.  567-70). EUS scholars, like political scientists more widely, 
therefore still often assume that they and the politics they study constitute separate spheres 
(Adler-Nissen & Kropp, 2015, p. 156; Oren, 2003, p. 20; see also Kaiser, 2010, p. 53).  
This scholarship-politics dichotomy imposes subtle, implicit rules, governing the habitual 
practices of writing, into which academic disciplines socialise scholars. The presence of the 
author, their emotions or viewpoint is for example acceptable in so-called mainstream 
political science, and in fact ubiquitous, when it discusses what can be called ‘internal’ 
academic issues such as theory and methodology. PS-EUS articles regularly express forceful 
opinions about theory (e.g. Stone Sweet & Sandholz, #24, p. 314) and speak about their 
authors having a hunch, something sparking their interest or surprising results (e.g. Hooghe, 
Marks & Wilson, #9, p. 985). However, unlike openly political genres such as hustings 
speeches or tabloid editorials, scholarship frowns on this normativity when it is applied to the 
object of study (Berling & Bueger, 2013, p. 116).  
In part, these practices of normativity go unrecognised because outside of the sociologically-
oriented French discipline, political science has been slow to develop a disciplinary 
‘sociology of itself’ (Eagleton-Pierce, 2011, pp. 805-6). Even where this has emerged in PS-
EUS, it focusses on more conspicuous issues such as the subfield’s transatlantic and 
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theoretical cleavages and has only very recently begun to engage with sociology of 
knowledge literature (Adler-Nissen & Kropp, 2015).  
Section one of this article explains in detail my criteria for selecting the 73 chosen texts and 
addresses the canon’s distinct Anglophone bias. Section two sets out how I identified 
expressions of political normativity, including implicitly through scholars’ use of language 
and evidence. Expressions of normativity are intensely complex. They can frame narratives in 
positive, negative or neutral terms. Whether they are accidental or deliberate, they can 
express a scholar’s ideological commitments, such as to European federalism or social 
democracy, or be generated ‘coincidentally’ in the reader’s perception, regardless of the 
author’s intention (Gilbert, 2008, p. 649). This section uses two key sociology insights. First, 
followers of Bourdieu and other sociologists insist that narratives and other ideational, 
‘subjective’ constructions interact with ‘material’, ‘objective’ contexts and constraints, such 
as how disciplines were organised (Parsons, 2010, pp. 149-50; Kauppi, 2003, p. 777; Madsen, 
2011, p. 260). Second, sociologists of knowledge note that issues ‘external’ and ‘internal’ to 
academia interpenetrate and influence one another (Adler-Nissen & Kropp, 2015, pp. 156 & 
160-65). Developments in European integration and academic theories therefore both shape 
scientific practices of expressing normativity and creating narratives. Some apparent 
normativity about the EU is, for example, a mere by-product of arguments about theory. 
The final section examines three important sets of narratives, concerning progressive 
integration, the democratic deficit and efficiency. Narratives of progress in grand theoretical 
debates explain much of the positive tone in canonical PS-EUS articles up to 1998. In 
contrast, discussion of the democratic deficit and the EU’s external effects account for much 
of the negative, critical turn since then. In part, these factors reflect the EU’s ‘sea of troubles’ 
since the millennium. However, they also mark a transformation in the agenda of EUS, from 
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trying to define European integration, to an often critical assessment of its politics and 
policies.  
 
Selecting the canon 
 
The canon was selected using Google Scholar, which for the purposes of this research, is less 
flawed than other citation databases (Harzing & van der Wal, 2008, pp. 63-65). All available 
databases are for example heavily weighted towards English-language work1, but Google 
Scholar at least indexes post-1993 sources in German and French. Nevertheless, all but one of 
the 73 canonical articles are in English. This reflects linguistic and disciplinary relations 
within EUS as well as Google’s linguistic bias. In 2006, the huge American and British EUS 
societies together accounted for 59% of global membership of such bodies (Rosamond, 2007, 
p. 10). Leading EUS scholars from all countries meanwhile publish in English-language 
‘international’ journals. Political science EUS is even more Anglo-Saxon. Political scientists 
constituted 78% and 50% respectively of the American and British EUS society members but 
were the majority in ‘barely 10%’ of all national EUS societies. For historical reasons, 
moreover, English speaking and especially American political scientists were largely 
responsible for prominent early theories of integration. Scholars of law and economics 
dominated EUS in continental countries because political science there developed later as an 
entirely autonomous discipline (Wæver, 1998, pp. 704-7). 
The Google search was limited in three ways. First, only peer-reviewed journal articles were 
chosen, leaving out books, reports, etc., which might have different conventions of 
normativity. Citations of books outnumber those of articles by more than two to one among 
all EUS works cited over 500 times. As Wæver notes, however, for ‘practitioners’, an 
8 
 
academic field ‘exists mostly in the journals’, and they constitute its ‘crucial institution’ 
(1998, p. 697). The total citations of the canonical writers above 100 cites were also checked, 
including their books. It turned out that there was a strong match between their ranking in 
both lists. Of the 17 authors in the top ten articles of my canon for example, 78% were also in 
the top ten of the longer list. 
Second, to get a sense of the narratives preoccupying PS-EUS at present, its most highly cited 
texts were chosen, but a series of progressively lower inclusion thresholds (see table below) 
were also used to include well-cited recent texts (since 2003). These have simply not had 
time to be cited as often as older works have been. These lower thresholds brought citations 
in 2003-10 up to an average of 3.5 per year, which is comparable with the 3.86 annual 
average in 1995-2001. The same attempt to compensate was not made for the period since 
2010, however, in which only one article has been cited over 100 times. These low numbers 
make the genuine preoccupations of EUS relatively uncertain. 
 
Canons of authoritative texts, repeatedly read and cited, are a key institution in any academic 
community. The hope is that the PS-EUS canon offers a model for normative practices in 
general. The canon is not necessarily a typical sample of PS-EUS literature, however. 
Threshold no. of 
citations 
Period No. articles No. articles 2003-6 No. articles 2007-13 
400 Open 52 7 1 
300 Since 2003 8 7 1 
200 Since 2007 4  4 
100 Since 2008 9  9 
Total  73 22 11 
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Political science requires authors to locate their work within the major theoretical debates that 
structure the disciplinary literature. This may create an overrepresentation of works on what 
are known as theoretical grand debates (11 articles), which receive an average of 751 cites 
each, compared to 468 for other articles, and literature reviews (five articles). By contrast, 
most writing on the EU is probably much more empirical (Andrews,, 2012, p. 757; 
Katzenstein, Keohane & Krasner, 1998, p. 655). 
Third, only political science articles were chosen for the canon. Interdisciplinary articles were 
included or excluded on the basis of the balance of the authors’ training and current 
departmental affiliations, the article’s subject matter and the journal’s declared disciplinary 
affiliation.  
Finally, in order to review a large number of articles efficiently, only their introductions and 
conclusions were examined. These sections are the most likely to contain normative language 
because this is where authors present their project and sum up the more technical analysis in 
the main body of the article. For example, authors quite often use their first paragraphs to 
make broad and eye-catching framing statements that are not necessarily very closely related 
to the article’s main argument. The first four sentences of the single most cited PS-EUS 
article therefore enthusiastically sets out the essence of the progressive narrative, It calls the 
EU ‘an extraordinary political experiment … [p]rogressing … in a consistent direction’, 
pooling ‘increasing areas of political authority’ through ‘prominent’ institutions which have 
‘transformed the nature of European politics’ (Pierson, 1996, p. 123). Conclusions often 
attempt a high level synthesis of the evidence that the body of an article closely analyses. 
This greater distance from the evidence gives freer rein to the author to interpret it 
imaginatively and link it with broader political or theoretical concerns that they feel strongly 
about and therefore discuss in normative terms.  
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Identifying normativity  
 
The empirical research centres on how building blocks of narratives represent integration or 
its works favourably or unfavourably. Normativity towards supranational integration is 
particularly important. Whereas the neo-functionalist progressive narrative insisted that 
supranational institutions like the European Commission and Parliament would grow in 
power, the rival intergovernmentalist theory claimed that member state governments 
remained in control. Normative expressions therefore include statements which contrast 
supranational integration and institutions with intergovernmentalism, nationalism and 
member states. Individual canonical articles frequently contain multiple normative 
expressions, which can support different narratives and take positive and negative stances 
towards different aspects of integration.  
As fig. 1 demonstrates, I used several criteria to identify expressions as normative. The most 
straightforward is explicit statement of opinion, criticising or praising some aspect of 
integration. Ernst Haas considers integration ‘most satisfying’ (#15, pp. 366 & 389). Fritz 
Scharpf by contrast describes the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy as ‘almost universally 
considered a grandiose failure’ (#3, p. 241). However, this explicit normativity is relatively 
rare. Fig. 1 therefore shows three more common types of normative expression, which imply 
praise or criticism more indirectly.  
First, several articles assert that some aspect of integration is failing or succeeding, or will do 
so. This implies that the integration project is well or ill-founded in some way, with particular 
implications for the progressive narrative. A common example is the opinion that the 
democratic deficit constitutes a serious problem for the EU. A surprising number of EUS 
authors contest this, illustrating the extent to which this opinion is a normative choice.  
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Second, a few articles explicitly recommend policy change, implicitly criticising present 
policy. Thomas Risse for example advocates informal networks and institutionalised 
‘communicative processes’ as more efficient decision-making mechanisms than ‘slow-
moving’ intergovernmental bargaining, which produces ‘nothing more than the lowest 
common denominator’ (e.g. #16, p. 73).  
Third, a very common form of normative expression is the choice of words and phrases such 
as ‘fortunately’, ‘improve’, ‘optimistic’, ‘succeed’, ‘good’, ‘should’ and their antonyms, 
especially if such language is repeated or extreme, or if more neutral synonyms are available. 
Scharpf for example describes some ‘beneficial programmes’ as ‘ridiculously under-
financed’ (#3, p. 241). Chadwick and May meanwhile use inverted commas to delegitimise 
managerial e-government’s emphasis on ‘“efficient”’ ‘“service delivery” to “customers”’ or 
‘“users”’ (#21, p. 272). These ‘scare-quotes’ ostentatiously disapprove of practitioners’ 
claims of efficiency and representations of citizens as customers. A very common variant of 
normative phraseology associates or disassociates integration with ideas such as progress, 
innovation, creativity, democracy, peace, fairness, efficiency, reform, idealism, solidarity, 
compromise and rationality, which Western culture or liberal scholars generally load with 
positive meaning. When Ian Manners describes the EU‘s ‘creative efforts and long-term 
vision’ as encouraging ‘a more just, cosmopolitan world’, for example, he references values 
of creativity, foresight, justice and cosmopolitanism which all have positive connotations for 
Western liberals (Manners, #58, p. 60).  
Fourth, an important criterion of normativity is the relationship between assertions and 
evidence. I treat statements like Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier’s warning 
about problems with EU conditionality mechanisms for enlargement (#8, p. 676) as non-
normative because they emerged directly from detailed empirical analysis in the articles. Fritz 
Scharpf (#3, p. 270) and Richard Eichenberg and Russell Dalton’s (#12, pp. 507-8) insistence 
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that the EC needed to ‘deal forcefully’ with vital ‘real problems’, does not. I treat their 
statements as normative because they instead help contextualize and interpret the authors’ 
evidence, which supports other conclusions. I do not consider whether representations of 
European integration correspond to any objective ‘reality’. 
Very occasionally, authors apparently select evidence for normative rhetorical effect. Peter 
Mair for example uses the French and Dutch referendum votes against the EU constitution in 
2005, and the lukewarm Luxembourg yes, as examples of ‘ebbing’ support for the EU, but 
never mentions the 77% yes vote in Spain’s referendum (#64, p. 2). Literature reviews can 
also be a rhetorical strategy for using evidence, in which it is not always entirely clear 
whether the author is endorsing or merely reporting the views of cited scholars (e.g. Wessels, 
#31, pp. 291-92). 
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Fig. 1. Angels and demons respectively represent types of normative expression that are 
positive or negative towards integration. 
 
These are all ways of judging individual normative expressions within articles rather than the 
overall stances of articles or authors. Risse’s policy recommendation above for example 
implicitly criticises the existing EU for not being supranational enough, so he is using a 
negative expression of normativity to advocate for greater integration. The very pro-
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integrationist Ernst Haas meanwhile despairs of integration’s prospects outside Europe (#15, 
p. 389). 
The assessment of individual normative expressions was then used to rate the overall tone of 
each canonical article on a scale of positivity. Scoring was based on (1), a judgement of the 
explicitness, forcefulness (e.g. strong language) and gratuitousness of individual normative 
expressions and (2), the degree to which they were repeated and consistently negative or 
positive across the article as a whole. Though this two stage process helped ensure 
consistency, the judgements nevertheless involved some subjectivity. A finely graduated 
scale for a simple judgement of articles as neutral, balanced (positive and negative statements 
cancel one another out) or very or slightly favourable/unfavourable towards European 
integration and its works was therefore eschewed. This resulted in a positivity scale running 
from +2 to -2, which in turn allowed the production of quite fine-grained quantitative results 
for the 73 articles as a whole. Their overall average positivity score was 0.03 for example. 
Two caveats are in order, the first concerning context. Clearly, normative vocabulary only 
counts in the analysis when it refers to European integration, but context is most crucial 
where it involves the relationship of statements to evidence. References to the democratic 
deficit are for example often presented briefly and with little supporting evidence in framing 
statements, sometimes to illustrate a broader European malaise. For this reason, the assertion 
at the start of Sean Carey’s article that EU citizens ‘have rarely had any direct involvement in 
the major political decisions made in their name’ is treated as highly normative (#29, p. 388). 
Not only is it unsupported by his empirical survey-based study of how Europeans identify 
with their nation and other territorial entities, but it is only loosely related to it. He instead 
appears to be making a deliberate declaration of his normative political position. By contrast, 
Simon Hix’s conclusion that political parties find it ‘very difficult’ to establish ‘stable’ pan-
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European alliances is treated as non-normative, because it emerges directly from his detailed 
empirical analysis of party alignments across the EU (#42, p. 92).  
The second caveat concerns author’s intention. The concern here is with narratives as a form 
of political communication which shapes opinion. Particular expressions as normative are 
therefore judged on the basis of whether readers, including relatively unsophisticated readers, 
such as undergraduates, are likely consciously or unconsciously to interpret them as such. 
This defines normativity very broadly. It can include assertions that, for example, a treaty is 
‘ambitious’ or the EU is a ‘unique laboratory’, which others might interpret as simple non-
normative statements of fact.  
This broad definition means that normativity is attributed to authors with very different 
degrees of commitment to political persuasion, apolitical science or reflection on their own 
normative writing practices. Some of the normative expressions identified are ambiguously 
and perhaps accidentally normative (e.g. Dür, #66, p. 1213; Hay & Rosamond, #30, p. 163), 
whereas certain other authors use strong language in canonical articles and are identified in 
their own writing or secondary sources as politically engaged. Fritz Scharpf (#3, p. 241) is 
thus firmly committed to the national welfare state for example, and refers to the EC’s 
‘pervasive sense of disappointment, frustration and general malaise’ and ‘the perversities of 
CAP’. The critical theorist Ian Manners meanwhile speaks about the EU’s ‘creative efforts’, 
promotion of ‘universally applicable’ normative principles and ‘ability to normalize a more 
just, cosmopolitan world’ (#58, pp.  45-47). 
Normative internal academic agendas add a crucial complication. As examples in the 
following section demonstrate, authors sometimes make what readers can interpret as 
normative statements about the EU in order to make arguments about academic theories or 
the disciplinary organisation of EU studies. The analysis therefore pays attention to 
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differences between surface meaning and, to the extent it can be reconstructed, the author’s 
agenda. 
 
The three narratives  
 
Representations of a progressive process of European integration and of its failure to create 
adequate institutions for democratic representation constitute quite coherent narratives. Three 
elements of these narratives appear to explain a key pattern detected in the canon. Positivity 
dropped from an average of 0.39 among the 17 articles published before 1998, to -0.11 
among the 56 later articles (see Fig. 2). More diverse sets of arguments reject the democratic 
deficit thesis and emphasise the importance of efficiency. 
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Fig. 2. The dark lines show how positivity before 1998 is reduced if grand theoretical debate 
articles are removed and positivity from 1998 increases if democratic deficit or external 
impact articles are removed. 
 
The progressive-teleological narrative [section can have national-regional, 
Europhile/sceptic/rationalist, timed external factors] 
Discussing the progressive narrative Gilbert identifies a systematic use in EUS of terms such 
as ‘Europe’s ‘path’, ‘march’, ‘advance’, ‘progress’’, re-launch, revival or, conversely, 
‘stagnation’ and ‘set-backs’. He argues that they turn progressive integration ‘into a creature 
with a vital life of its own’ (2008, p. 645). Judgements by authors of the success or failure of 
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measures, he adds, depend ‘almost always [on] whether they augmented or reduced’ 
supranationality, describing reforms as ‘limited’, ‘tinkering’ or ‘piecemeal’ if they do not. 
This is a longstanding criticism of EUS. In 1971, Donald Puchala complained that it focussed 
on what integration ’should be and … be leading towards’ rather than on ‘what it really is’ 
(#51, p. 268). Two decades later, Alan Milward and Vibeke Sørensen described EUS’s 
central theory of neo-functionalism, which since the 1960s represented integration as self-
reinforcing teleological progress towards supranationalism, as a creature of America’s Cold 
War foreign policy and European policy-making (1994, pp. 2-3). Gilbert agrees that ‘[a]lmost 
all scholars of European integration’, have ‘blithe confidence in the inevitability’ of 
‘profoundly desirable’ progress towards ‘ever more complex forms of supranational 
government’ and ‘gradual erosion of national sovereignty’ (Gilbert, 2008, pp. 641-42, 649-
50). Even Stanley Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalist critique opposed neo-functionalism 
‘gloomily’, recognising its ‘optimism’ (Cafruny & Ryner, 2009, p. 223).  
The issue of whether the EU has been, will be or should be becoming more deeply integrated 
and transferring power from member states to supranational institutions, is a key issue in the 
canon, mentioned normatively (and mostly positively) in 26 of the 73 articles. Richard 
Eichenberg and Russell Dalton (#12, p. 507) exemplify Gilbert’s narrative, describing the 
Single European Act and Maastricht Treaty as an ‘ambitious’ ‘historic threshold’ following ‘a 
decade of stagnation’. James Caporaso’s description of integration’s ‘incoherent path … 
disjointed, moves forward (and backward) in fits and starts’ (#11, p. 30) meanwhile typifies 
the negativity towards non-progressive change. 
The inherently teleological nature of the progressive narrative, perhaps combined with 
positivist ambitions for the predictive power of science, leads PS-EUS scholars to make 
normative statements about the future of integration. Alec Stone Sweet and Wayne Sandholz 
predict that integration will continue to deepen and become more supranational because ‘the 
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long-term interests of member state governments will be increasingly biased towards the 
long-term interests of transnational society’ (#24, pp. 314-15). A consoling perspective for 
pro-integrationists compares the ‘historical process of state building’ of the EU and the pre-
Civil War United States, implying that the present uncertain and halting integration process 
may ultimately culminate in close unity (Caporaso, #11, p. 30). Eight canonical texts 
reference innovation and creativity, a key element of Europe’s progressive-teleological 
narrative. Jachtenfuchs describes the ‘exciting’ and ‘important’ ‘transformation’ of nation-
states into ‘a new transnational political system’, where ‘fundamental developments are 
probably transforming the possibilities of effective and responsible governance’ (#23, pp. 256 
& 260). Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank praise the EU’s ‘innovative jurisprudence’ 
(#2, p. 372). 
Canonical narratives frequently represent integration as the EU’s power struggle against its 
member nation states. Burkard Eberlein and Dieter Kerwer say the EU ‘has overcome’ 
member-state interests to move into new policy fields (#60, p. 122). Nation-states are 
commonly portrayed as the violent, selfish, Machiavellian, regressive antitheses of the 
peaceful, just and open European future. Five canonical articles link the EU with cooperation, 
negotiation, decentralisation and peace and twelve refer to selfish, anti-democratic, cynical, 
hierarchical and violent nation states. Critical scholars argue that key theoretical frameworks, 
including neo-functionalism, transactionalism, and neo-institutionalism, ‘idealized’ 
integration ‘as the ‘rational’ and ‘general’’, in contrast to the ‘irrational’, ‘special interests’ 
and ‘power politics’ of states and their international system (Cafruny & Ryner, 2009, pp.  
222-23). Jeffrey Lewis identifies the practice of ‘appeals to fairness or principled debate’ as 
part of the socialisation of EU officials into EU norms, based on his empirical observations 
(#59, p. 969). He normatively contrasts this with the chance that they can ‘revert to more 
egoistic and instrumental' national stances. Substituting national interest, democratic 
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representativeness or patriotism for egoism would leave his basic point largely intact but 
dramatically change its normative tone. Gary Marks et al. discuss state power and control in 
the emotionally charged language of loss; it has ‘slipped away’, been ‘diluted’; states ‘lose 
their grip’ and ‘weaken’ (#2, pp. 342-43). The authors then however hint that this is a 
civilising process. States are ‘extremely powerful … capable of crushing’ threats and 
‘systematically wielding violence’ but, weakened by mutual ‘mistrust’, are ‘melded gently’ 
into the EU, with its more attractive characteristics of ‘mutual dependence’ and 
‘complementary functions’ (Marks et al., #2, pp. 371-72). Emphasising teleological progress, 
several authors contrast historical ‘national rulers’, who ‘reinforced national solidarity by 
impelling their populations’ into war and ‘great suffering’, with European integration 
‘thankfully’ not using ‘coercion’ (Hooghe & Marks, #10, p. 23; Zürn, #40, p. 212).  
Academic factionalism and the geography of scholarship interacted with normative 
narratives.  More than half of the eleven articles that address theoretical grand debates in EUS 
reference the progressive narrative. Though recognising difficulties in integration, many were 
critical of nation states and stressed the progress of integration, plus sometimes its 
innovativeness and necessity. The average positivity score for grand debate articles was a 
very high 1.11. Grand debate texts leaning towards supranationalism, with an even higher 
positivity score of 1.125, outnumbered intergovernmentalist articles by four to one.  
A new Comparative Politics (CP) challenge to both IR, its disciplinary rival, and to 
intergovernmentalism, led to eight of the grand debates articles clustering in 1995-98 (Diez & 
Wiener, 2009, p. 9). Their high positivity level (0.75) largely explains that of this period. 
Without them, the positivity of the nine other pre-1998 articles is just 0.1 (see Fig 1). For 
intergovernmentalists, the pre-integration landscape of state-dominated IR remained central 
and essentially intact. Moravcsik argues that ‘bargaining and delegation by explicit 
governmental agreement better explains most important decisions in EU history than the 
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supranationalist alternative’ (#37, p. 625). By contrast, CP scholars turned towards the EU 
following the Maastricht Treaty because integration had become ‘so advanced’ (Bulmer, #31, 
p. 352; Christiansen, Jorgensen & Wiener #43, p. 528). Their analyses of the EU’s day-to-day 
functioning minimised the role of member states and their occasional grand bargains 
(Pierson, #1, p. 124). Gilbert therefore characterises neo-institutionalist CP scholars like Paul 
Pierson as sharing the supranationalist faith of neo-functionalism (Gilbert, 2008, pp. 641-42, 
649-50). In 1999, the CP scholar Hix explicitly challenged IR’s traditional leadership of PS-
EUS, insisting that ‘the EU is now more a ‘political system’ than an international 
organisation’ (#42, p. 69). This change in the object of study had a profound influence on 
scholarship. Articles of empirical CP research on governance, policy-making, institutional 
design, political parties, Europeanisation and lobbying soared from 23% of my canon prior to 
1998 to 53% thereafter. The switch from IR grand bargains to day-to-day politics contributed 
to European scholars, defined by nationality, PhD venue and current workplace, supplanting 
the previously central role of Americans in EUS (McMahon 2017). Americans were slightly 
more numerous among canonical IR authors but Europeans overwhelmingly dominated CP 
EUS. Though European scholars are systematically somewhat more negative about European 
integration than Americans, CP-IR differences in positivity were at least three times greater, 
suggesting that subdiscipline largely explains transatlantic differences.  
The unremarkable normativity and positivity (-0.125) of the 32 articles of empirical CP 
research help explain the decline of positivity after 1998. CP contributions to grand debates 
apparently account for much of the positivity in 1995-98 because Hix and others specifically 
emphasised supranational progress in grand debate articles in order to advance their 
disciplinary claim to priority in EUS. The internal academic agendas of academics therefore 
produced language which a reader can interpret as politically normative.  
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Intensifying integration is the main preoccupation of the progressive narrative but 13 articles 
(five on enlargement and eight on the EU’s global influence) deal with the expanding 
geographical impact of European integration, and at least 10 focus exclusively on this. 
Almost all external impact articles were published in 2000-8, coinciding closely with the 
negotiation of the EU’s eastern enlargement. Manners’s piece on the EU’s normative power 
(2007) celebrates Europe’s potential to encourage a new, peaceful form of international 
relations and promote liberal norms outside Europe. However external impact texts are 
relatively negative in tone (positivity: -0.33). In their absence, positivity for the period since 
1998 rises from -0.11 to -0.05 (see Fig. 2). About eight texts criticise the EU’s double 
standards, incoherent external relations and harmful effects. The two on migration policy are 
especially critical (Guiraudon, #50; Huysmans, #13). Texts that portray the EU as ‘a unique 
laboratory’, implicitly suggest that its innovations can be copied elsewhere (Jachtenfuchs, 
#23, p. 260), but articles that focus on external impact highlight problems with exporting 
Europe’s model. Ernst Haas believes integration contributes to world peace but is deeply 
pessimistic about the ‘pleasant’ prospect of its development outside Europe (#15, pp.  366 & 
389). Wolfgang Wessels suggests that widening and deepening may be incompatible, as 
eastern enlargement might require ‘bold’ and difficult constitutional reforms (#31, p.  292).  
 
Democratic deficit narratives 
Worries about democracy are central to three canonical articles and raised in normative terms 
by 32 others, often linked with normative turn issues of elitism and technocracy. Rejections 
and near-rejections of EU treaties since 1993 have made the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ 
between the EU’s increased powers and its insufficiently democratic political system a core 
issue for even pro-European PS-EUS scholars (Bellamy & Attucci, 2009, pp. 198-99; Gilbert, 
2008, pp. 648-49). Thomas Risse for example considers ‘the consequences of ignoring’ this 
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problem ‘disastrous’ (# 16, p. 74) and along with Matthew Gabel and Harvey Palmer (#36, p. 
13), offers policy recommendations to address it. Democratic deficit worries are sometimes 
expressed in strongly normative terms. One article for example complains that although 
member states ‘[n]ot surprisingly’ resist ‘the EU interfering with national production and 
welfare regimes’, ‘European elites’ show an ‘alarming tendency’ not to take’ the public’s 
‘growing unease … seriously enough’ (Höpner & Schäfer, #67, p. 364). Many other 
references to democracy are only normative however, in the sense that they recognise it as a 
serious problem for European integration and its progress (e.g. Hix, #42, p. 70).  
Pro-integration scholars deflect blame for the democratic deficit to member states. Hooghe 
and Marks present national leaders as irresponsible cynics, stimulating Euroscepticism 
among the less ‘cognitively sophisticated’ general public through an ‘elitist style’ of 
negotiating EU institutional change (#10, p. 22; Marks et al., #2, pp.  371-73). Member 
governments ‘purport’ incorrectly to represent all their citizens by intensifying ‘national 
stubbornness in European negotiations’, while trying to preserve ‘log-rolling and side-
payments’ (Hooghe & Marks, #10, p. 22). These and other authors argue that member 
governments use ‘strategic’ European integration rhetoric to push through ‘unpalatable 
reforms’, shifting decisions to the EU level ‘to shed responsibility’ for them (Hay & 
Rosamond, #30, p. 163; Marks et al., #2, p. 371). This argument is normative to the extent 
that authors or readers object to manipulative, sneaky government strategies to sell reforms. 
Democracy concerns are the third major explanation for falling positivity. Since 1998, 
articles normatively referencing democracy have a positivity of -0.41 while the remaining 
articles score 0.13 (see Fig. 2). Negativity is concentrated in the five texts which warn that 
the democracy problem is worsening (positivity -1.6), and also in the 13 articles from 2002-7 
(positivity -0.8), when Irish, French and Dutch voters rejected the Nice, Constitutional or 
Lisbon EU reform treaties in four separate referenda. Other articles referencing democracy 
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are slightly positive on average. A surprising portion of theorists are quite sanguine on the 
subject (Schmidt, #70, p. 2). Jonas Tallberg identifies a synergistic ‘mutual empowerment’ of 
supranational EU institutions and the ‘citizens and companies’ who use them to complain 
about infringements of European law (#38, p. 638). Andreas Dür cites studies of EU lobbying 
that aim to counter the ‘simplistic … popular’ view of ‘all-powerful interest groups’, 
implying that EU governance is somewhat better than stereotypes suggest (#66, p. 1213). 
Andrew Moravcsik’s exceptionally clear and comprehensive rejection of democratic deficit 
worries as ‘unsupported by the existing empirical evidence’ may offer a second example of 
academic agendas influencing normative narratives of integration (#4, p. 605). Andreas 
Føllesdal and Hix (#6, p. 541) describe his arguments on the democratic deficit as 
‘extensions’ of his liberal-intergovernmental theory of European integration, around which he 
constructed his entire career. Some elements of Moravcsik’s argument, such as describing EU 
democracy as ‘very much in line with the general practice of most modern democracies’ (#4, 
pp.  621-22) do not necessarily support this accusation. Other key elements, such as insisting 
that the EU is ‘restricted by treaty and practice to a modest subset of the substantive 
activities’ of modern states (#4, p. 607), certainly do however. Moravcsik’s quest for liberal-
intergovernmentalist explanations for practically all major developments in EU politics (e.g. 
Moravscik & Vachudova, 2003) suggest his democracy article was part of a campaign to 
demonstrate its comprehensiveness as a grand theory, and therefore, as theoretical rivals 
complain, ‘aggressively’ demonstrate ‘its superiority’ (Stone Sweet & Sandholz, #24, p. 298). 
Moravcsik thus boasted that ‘many critics now concede’ that his theory ‘remains 
indispensable and fundamental to any account of regional integration’ (#37, p. 625). 
The progressive-teleological and democratic deficit narratives interact in complex ways. Hix 
describes concerns about democracy as a ‘by-product’ of enhanced and increasingly 
politicised integration, as the EU has massively expanded its competences since the 1992 
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Maastricht Treaty (1999, p. 70). This external issue interacted with two internal factors to 
promote the rise of critical scholarship, which stressed left-wing political engagement over 
scientific traditions of objectivity. First, critical work in my canon overlapped strongly with 
reflectivist approaches that spread into political science in the 1990s from sociology, 
philosophy and cultural studies. Second, canonical reflectivists and critical scholars were 
overwhelmingly of European origin and therefore benefitted from the thorough 
Europeanisation of EUS scholarship from the 1990s on (McMahon 2017). 
Some critical EUS scholars have denounced the ‘imperialist’, ‘neo-liberal’ EU but others 
placed their hopes in its ‘post-national and cosmopolitan democracy’, implying teleological 
progress beyond the nation-state era (Manners, 2007, pp. 77-78). Føllesdal and Hix disagree 
with Moravcsik’s ‘optimistic conclusions’ about EU democracy but predict a brighter future 
(#6, pp.  556-57). ‘All is not lost … change is on its way’ in transnational political alignments 
and institutions, which ‘may not even require fundamental reform’, while democratic 
contestation has ‘started to emerge’. Other theorists offer very conditional hope for progress. 
Sandra Lavenex qualifies her rather negative assessment of EU external governance by 
leaving open the ‘long run’ possibility that adaptation by the EU and its member states, ‘if 
successful’, could create greater ‘politics of inclusion’ (#35, p. 695). Simon Bulmer 
meanwhile states that European institutions developed ‘ahead of a popular, democratic 
groundswell of support’ and ‘in advance of the structures for ensuring democratic 
legitimation’ (#31, p. 353). The phrases ‘ahead of’ and ‘in advance of’ suggest an expected 
future. Some leading rational choice scholars in the canon reverse the causal relationship; 
democracy might ‘slow down the pace’ of integration (Gabel & Palmer, #36, p. 13; Tsebelis 
& Garrett, #28, p. 32; #46, p. 384). They argue that once those citizens ‘least able to benefit 
from EC membership’ realise that the European Parliament has increased its powers, they 
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may demand that MEPs ‘act more as delegates’ than as ‘pro-integrationist coconspirators 
with the Commission and Court’.  
 
Efficiency narratives 
 
For scholars of institutional design in particular, efficiency and effectiveness are key 
normative considerations, expressed in normative language in 14 canonical articles. Tallberg 
repeats the adjective ‘effective’ for the EU’s compliance mechanisms four times in the first 
three paragraphs of his conclusion (#38, pp. 637-38). In four paragraphs of their introduction, 
tracing the history of European institutions, Tsebelis and Garrett use the terms ‘remarkably 
effective’, ‘legislative gridlock’ (twice), ‘ineffective’, ‘hamstrung’, ‘effective’ and ‘gridlock’ 
(#46, pp.  358-59). In contrast to other articles, those referencing efficiency became much 
more positive after the millennium. Far from explaining the drop in positivity therefore, it 
becomes wider if these articles are removed. 
The broadest efficiency narrative is that integration is a practical necessity to provide 
‘benefits’ and address ‘real problems’, which member states cannot handle singly 
(Eichenberg & Dalton, #12, p. 508; Scharpf, #3, p. 270). Three articles for example argue that 
globalisation requires international political organisation. Linking efficiency and democracy, 
Eichenberg and Dalton say ‘elites must convince their domestic audiences that the benefits of 
further integration are worth their costs’. This might just be an objective analysis of political 
strategy, but by adding that ‘active public support’ is needed for the EU ‘to deal forcefully’ 
with issues confronting it (#12, p. 508), they hint that they also normatively believe the 
benefits of integration outweigh its costs. 
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Five articles on ‘new governance’ techniques, such as the open method of coordination, 
multi-level governance and policy networks, tightly link narratives of efficiency, innovation 
and democracy. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (#8, pp. 674-75) distinguish between the 
‘hierarchical’ ‘old governance’, involving ‘command, control, and steering by the state’, and 
the ‘‘new’ or ‘network governance’ … based on horizontal co-ordination and co-operation, 
negotiated in decentralized settings’. Their normative language about ‘bureaucratic actors’ 
and ‘a top-down process’ imposing rules, even where ‘societal actors should have played an 
important role’, suggests that they see the new governance as more socially representative. 
Whereas scholars are largely positive about governance innovations, many recognise that 
they may pose problems of elitism and opacity. John Peterson for example suggests that 
democracy and efficiency may not be entirely reconcilable. He says policy networks ‘bring 
advantages’ for ‘policy innovation’, allow ‘affected interests to participate directly’ and ‘curb 
the excesses of public power’ but may have ‘sinister’ implications for democracy (#19, p. 
88). He quotes both a national official complaining about ‘real decisions’ being taken in 
‘cosy chats’ with EU officials and EU officials praising these ‘useful and ‘important’ 
‘informal conciliations’ (Peterson, #19, p. 87). Moravcsik meanwhile insists that certain 
public institutions work better when insulated from democratic control (#4, p. 614). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Identifying normativity in scholarly writing is challenging and necessarily subjective. This 
article has therefore sought to clarify its interpretative process as much as possible. I found 
that the vast majority of canonical PS-EUS texts contain some normative commentary on 
European integration, its institutions and policies. These shifted from largely positive towards 
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European integration and its works before 1998 to greater negativity afterwards. I found three 
explanatory factors for this.  
One is that in a batch of highly cited grand debate articles, clustered in 1995-98, CP scholars 
successfully presented an alternative to IR-centred intergovernmentalist EUS. By arguing that 
the advanced state of supranational integration necessitated their research on the EU’s day-to-
day operations, they contributed to the progressive narrative, one of the longest-standing and 
most powerful narrative traditions in EUS, including among canonical PS-EUS texts. This 
teleological narrative sometimes takes such forms as predictions and hopes. It celebrates 
supranational integration as an innovative force for peace and rationality, gradually but 
successfully supplanting the cynical and brutal old nation state system. 
The other two factors encouraging the more negative tone after 1998 were the EU’s external 
impact and its democratic deficit, which became increasingly prominent in PS-EUS writing. 
Democratic deficit articles were much more numerous and had a more significant effect, 
though surprising numbers of them were relatively relaxed about the EU’s democratic 
legitimacy. The democratic deficit and progressive narratives interacted in complex ways. 
Ten authors believed more effective democracy was on the way, though one rational choice 
article thought more democracy would empower opponents of further integration. 
The third major group of narratives of integration, concerning the EU’s efficiency in 
functioning, delivering benefits and addressing Europe’s problems, were also entangled with 
the other narratives. Innovative new forms of governance and the technocratic threat they 
posed to democracy were, for example, major concerns.  
Factors external to academia impact on EUS. The passage of time made new problems of 
globalisation more prominent in PS-EUS than congratulatory old narratives of escaping war 
among European states. The EU’s constitutional crisis and new responsibilities for difficult 
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external-impact issues such as migration also help explain why scholars became increasingly 
pessimistic and critical about integration. Scholars had more liberty to imbue the earlier, 
relatively content-free phase of the European project with positive cosmopolitan ideals and 
hopes. Deepening integration also assured the triumph of the CP agenda of studying EU 
politics and policy, side-lining the grand ontological debates of twentieth-century PS-EUS. 
This internal academic upheaval then made CP preoccupations, such as the democratic 
deficit, external impact and efficiency, prominent in the PS-EUS canon. By marginalising the 
grand debate’s disciplinary and theoretical arguments meanwhile, it restrained the rhetorical 
use of normative language about the EU.  
This illustrates the difficulty in neatly distinguishing normative language about integration 
and about theoretical or disciplinary agendas. For example, Hix’s perhaps spoke of the EU’s 
‘enormous’ or ‘increasing impact’ to advocate for CP’s role in studying it. Readers, 
particularly if unfamiliar with intra-disciplinary agendas of this kind, could be forgiven for 
understanding a normative endorsement of the progressive narrative. I attempt elsewhere to 
isolate Europhile and Eurosceptic convictions from internal academic impulses for EUS 
scholars’ normativity (McMahon 2017), but this is never entirely possible. 
If EUS indeed influences policy-makers’ narratives of European integration, EUS scholars 
should be aware of how their practices of normative writing construct these narratives. Even 
without political influence however, scholars need reflexivity about practices like normative 
expression, in order to avoid reproducing unconscious biases. Did different national 
narratives about European identity for example shape EUS debate about the specific 
geography of EU enlargement? As Pierre Bourdieu argues, continuous awareness of ‘the 
implications and presuppositions of the routine operations of scientific practice’ is ‘a 
particularly effective means’ for scholars to improve our ‘chances of attaining truth’ (2004, p. 
89).  
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Appendix: Canonical texts 
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EUP: European Union Politics, IO: International Organization, JEI: Journal of European 
integration, JEPP: Journal of European Public Policy, JCMS: Journal of Common Market 
Studies, JoP: Journal of Politics, WEP: West European Politics 
 
Number of citations, Rank in canon, Authors, Year of publication, Title, Journal 
1765, 1, P Pierson, 1996, The Path to European Integration, CPS 
1610, 2, G Marks et al., 1996, European Integration from the 1980s, JCMS 
1563, 3, FW Scharpf, 1988, The joint-decision trap, Public Administration 
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655, 12, RC Eichenberg, RJ Dalton, 1993, Europeans and the European Community, IO 
623, 13, J Huysmans, 2000, securitization of migration, JCMS 
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Notes 
1 Thomas Diez (personal communication, July 10, 2015) also noted that my harvesting 
software failed to find certain highly cited articles. This is probably due to Google’s secret 
search algorithm, which lists results in order of ‘relevance’.  
 
                                                          
